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ABSTRACT 
Heuristics are often viewed as inferior to “rational” strategies that exhaustively search and 
process information. Introducing the theoretical perspective of ecological rationality, we 
challenge this view and argue that under conditions of uncertainty common to managerial 
decision making, managers can actually make better decisions using fast-and-frugal heuristics. 
Within the context of personnel selection, we show that a heuristic called Δ-inference can more 
accurately predict which of two job applicants would perform better in the future than logistic 
regression, a prototypical rational strategy. Using data from 236 applicants at an airline 
company, we demonstrate in Study 1 that despite searching less than half of the cues, Δ-
inference can lead to more accurate selection decisions than logistic regression. After this 
existence proof, we examine in Study 2 the ecological conditions under which the heuristic 
predicts more accurately than logistic regression using 1,728 simulated task environments. 
Finally, in Study 3, we show in an experiment that participants adapted their strategies to the 
characteristics of a task, and increasingly so the greater their previous experience in selection 
decisions. The aim of this article is to propose ecological rationality as an alternative to current 
views about the nature of heuristics in managerial decisions.  
Keywords: ecological rationality, fast-and-frugal heuristics, comparative model testing, Δ-
inference, heuristics and biases, personnel selection, selection decisions  
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 It is widely held that managers use heuristics to make decisions, but also that they should 
not. Heuristics are often considered inferior, or second-best, to strategies that are deemed 
“rational” because they exhaustively search and process all available information (e.g., 
Bazerman & Moore, 2008; Dean & Sharfman, 1993, 1996). Strongly influenced by the 
“heuristics and biases” research program in psychology (e.g., Gilovich, Griffin, & Kahneman, 
2002; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), the underlying assumption is that managers’ bounded 
cognitive capacities lead them to use heuristics, and that doing so leads to dangerous biases (i.e., 
systematic deviations from logic and probability theories; Hammond, Keeney, & Raiffa, 1998) 
and ultimately less effective decisions (Dean & Sharfman, 1993). Their use is tolerated by a 
presumed general effort-accuracy tradeoff, whereby decision makers save on effort but only in 
exchange for lower accuracy (Beach & Mitchell, 1978; Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1993).  
Research on ecological rationality fundamentally challenges this view of heuristics as 
second-best and argues that “less can be more,” that is, better decisions can be made with less 
information (Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011; Todd, Gigerenzer, & the ABC Research Group, 
2012). Extending Herbert Simon’s theory of bounded rationality (1947; 1955), theorizing on 
ecological rationality posits that not only fast-and-frugal heuristics search and process less 
information but many conditions exist under which they can actually lead to better decisions 
(Gigerenzer, 2016). Thus, even if managers had unbounded cognitive capacities, they could still 
make more accurate, efficient, and effective decisions using heuristics under many real-world 
managerial conditions, in contrast to the notion of a general effort-accuracy tradeoff.  
In addition, ecological rationality views decision makers as having access to an “adaptive 
toolbox” of strategies, including both fast-and-frugal heuristics and more complex strategies 
(Gigerenzer & Selten, 2002). Effective decision makers select and adapt an appropriate strategy 
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from this toolbox according to the structure of the environment. Simple heuristics such as the 
recognition heuristic, with which decision makers select options they recognize, can work 
surprisingly well (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 2011). Research has also shown that experts use 
heuristics in a variety of contexts, including the medical (Wegwarth, Gaissmaier & Gigerenzer, 
2009) and judicial domains (Dhami, 2003).   
Furthermore, unlike the laws of logic and probability theories, which are sometimes held as 
universal standards of good reasoning, an ecological rationality perspective does not naïvely 
claim that heuristics are always better but instead emphasizes the fit between a decision strategy 
and task requirements and, more generally, between the organism and its environment (Todd et 
al., 2012). A strategy is ecologically rational to the degree that it reaches a goal, such as accurate 
predictions, for a certain type of task. Interestingly, some of the conditions typical of managerial 
decisions match well with those under which heuristics tend to be particularly effective, 
including fundamental uncertainty (rather than risk; Knight, 1921) and limited opportunities to 
learn (Gigerenzer, 2016). Under these conditions, it becomes exceedingly difficult to predict 
future states or events (rather than fit to past data) such as the performance of a job candidate, the 
effectiveness of a novel strategy, or the success of a new venture. For example, the future 
performance of job candidates, a key criterion in personnel selection decisions, is notoriously 
difficult to predict based on applicant data, with about 70% of the variance unexplained even 
after using the most valid predictors (Highhouse, 2008; Schmidt & Hunter, 1998). In such tasks, 
complex strategies tend to extract too much from existing data, mistaking noise for signal; as a 
result, they overfit. In contrast, by ignoring the less important information, simple heuristics can 
end up being more robust and better at predicting the outcomes of different options (Gigerenzer, 
2016; Newell & Simon, 1972). 
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The present research introduces ecological rationality to the study of managerial heuristics 
at both prescriptive and descriptive levels. To advance this novel approach, we present three 
studies situated within the context of personnel selection. We chose this context for two main 
reasons. First, recruiting the right people is one of the most influential managerial decisions, with 
managers considering talent acquisition among the top current priorities (Schwartz, Collins, 
Stockton, & Wagner, 2017) and organizations devoting tremendous resources to recruiting (e.g., 
US$124 billion in 2011 alone; Leonard, 2011). Second, whereas a considerable literature in 
personnel selection has focused on the validities of different cues to predict future performance 
(Schmidt & Hunter, 1998), comparatively little research has examined how cues are integrated, 
heuristically or with more complex strategies, to reach decisions (Kausel & Slaughter, 2013).  
The goal of Study 1 is to show that a heuristic can result in more frugal (i.e., searching 
fewer cues) and more accurate personnel decisions than a “rational” strategy that considers all 
available information. This study, however, provides only an existence proof and no ecological 
analysis of the conditions under which less can be more. Study 2 attempts to fill this gap by 
systematically investigating such conditions using computer simulations with realistic 
parameters in personnel decisions. Building on these prescriptive findings, Study 3 is descriptive 
and asks whether people actually adapt their use of strategies to task characteristics.  
Our research makes several theoretical contributions. First, it contributes broadly to the 
theory of managerial decision making by introducing ecological rationality as a novel 
perspective on managerial heuristics. We provide the first comprehensive investigation of both 
descriptive and prescriptive aspects of fast-and-frugal heuristics in managerial decision making. 
In so doing, we extend initial ventures in this area (Artinger et al., 2015; Luan & Reb, 2017) and 
challenge views of managerial heuristics as inferior to “rational” managerial decision strategies. 
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Moreover, we argue that the performance of managerial heuristics depends on their fit to the 
environment. As such, we propose a more nuanced and balanced theory of managerial heuristics 
and move the conversation towards a contingency theory of managerial decision making, where 
the rationality of decision strategies, heuristic or otherwise, is primarily ecological rather than 
economic or logical (in the sense of internal consistency).  
Second, our research contributes more specifically to the literature on personnel selection. 
Much research on personnel selection has focused on the assessment and validities of different 
cues (e.g., Sackett & Lievens, 2008; Schmidt & Hunter, 1998), and some has examined what 
cues managers actually use, such as general mental ability, conscientiousness, and interview 
performance (e.g., Dougherty, Ebert, & Callender, 1986; Kausel, Culbertson, & Madrid, 2016). 
By examining how cues are used, our research responds to calls for more work on cue integration 
and decision strategies in personnel selection (e.g., Kausel & Slaughter, 2013; Ryan & Ployhart, 
2014). This process-oriented research not only helps advance understanding of selection 
decisions but is also relevant to practice: By understanding the process of cue integration, we can 
find intervention spots and design suitable aids to improve selection decisions.  
Finally, our research makes a methodological contribution by introducing methodologies 
commonly used in the study of ecological rationality. We demonstrate how they can be applied 
to study managerial heuristics in a robust, falsifiable, and in-depth manner by employing the 
following principles (Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011): (1) formal models of heuristics, as 
opposed to mere verbal labels; (2) comparative testing of heuristics versus other strategies, as 
opposed to testing a single model; and (3) testing the predictive accuracy of strategies, as in out-
of-sample predictions, as opposed to only fitting parameters of a model to known data. We also 
discuss how these methodologies could be valuable in studying other important questions in 
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organizational and management scholarship. 
THEORY 
Managerial Heuristics as Products of Bounded Rationality 
In 1947, Simon published Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision-Making Processes 
in Administrative Organizations, a book with seminal impact on organizational scholarship 
equaled by few others. In it, Simon argued that administrative behavior (i.e., management) can 
be viewed as a collection of decision-making activities and that an insightful way to understand 
organizations is to study the decision-making processes of managers: “Decision-making is the 
heart of administration, and the vocabulary of administrative theory must be derived from the 
logic and psychology of human choice” (xiii–xiv). Ever since Simon’s work, decision making, 
such as personnel selection and strategic decision making, has been considered a (if not the) 
quintessential managerial task.   
Simon’s contribution went beyond identifying decision making as an essential managerial 
activity. In discussing how managers make decisions, Simon fleshed out the ideas of bounded 
rationality for the first time. In the introduction to the second edition of the book (1957: xxv), he 
wrote: “While economic man [sic] maximizes—selects the best alternative from among all those 
available to him; his cousin, whom we shall call administrative man [sic], satisfices—looks for a 
course of action that is satisfactory or ‘good enough’.” For humans to satisfice, Simon proposed 
that they rely mostly on heuristics, simple but effective mental tools for problem solving and 
decision making, because their cognitive capacities are bounded (Simon, 1955, 1990). This view 
of bounded rationality as resulting from cognitive limitations has been the prevailing explanation 
of why managers use heuristics.  
Yet Simon also argued that in an uncertain world, which characterizes many managerial 
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decisions, no single strategy performs best across all situations. Instead, rationality depends on 
how well a strategy fits the task environment. He expressed this with a scissors analogy: “Human 
rational behavior… is shaped by a scissors whose two blades are the structure of task 
environments and the computational capabilities of the actor” (Simon, 1990: 7). This adaptive 
view of heuristics was the starting point for the systematic study of the ecological rationality—as 
opposed to the economic or logical (ir)rationality—of heuristics. 
Managerial Heuristics as Products of Ecological Rationality 
Subsequent to Simon’s original work, the environmental fit aspect of bounded rationality 
was largely neglected in favor of the limited cognitive capacities aspect as the heuristics and 
biases program became dominant in research on judgment and decision making (e.g., Gilovich et 
al., 2002; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), including managerial decision making (e.g., Highhouse, 
Dalal, & Salas, 2013). This program focuses on how using heuristics leads to outcomes that 
depart systematically from those dictated by logical or statistical rules. Similarly, the assumed 
gold standard for managerial decision making is often economic or logical rationality, and most 
biases studied in managerial decision making are violations of coherence or consistency (e.g., 
Bazerman & Moore, 2008). Interestingly, research suggests that there is little evidence that 
violations of syntactical, content-blind axioms of consistency are costly in terms of less wealth, 
health, or happiness (Arkes, Gigerenzer, & Hertwig, 2016). 
More recently, some research has taken a different approach to managerial heuristics. 
Eisenhardt, Bingham, and colleagues argued in both qualitative (Bingham & Eisenhardt, 2011) 
and simulation studies (Davis, Eisenhardt, & Bingham, 2009) that using simple rules to make 
strategic decisions is not only fast but also highly effective. Their findings suggest that 
organizations learn portfolios of heuristics for strategic decision making that contribute to their 
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competitive advantage (Bingham & Haleblian, 2012). The authors concluded that “heuristics 
constitute ‘rational’ strategy in unpredictable markets” and can be “more effective than 
information-intensive, cognitively demanding approaches” (Bingham & Eisenhardt, 2011: 1438). 
Artinger et al. (2015) provided a conceptual review of several fast-and-frugal heuristics together 
with a discussion of their benefits and potential applications in management. Luan and Reb 
(2017) meanwhile demonstrated empirically that fast-and-frugal trees, an effective family of 
heuristics for binary decisions, are valid descriptive models of performance-based managerial 
decisions and that decision makers respond adaptively to changes in the base rates of a task when 
using them.  
The above studies question the notion that logic and economic rationality are the universal 
gold standards of managerial decision making. An alternative is ecological rationality, where the 
rationality of using a heuristic or any other strategy is evaluated by its success in an uncertain 
world (Todd et al., 2012). This evaluation applies two perspectives: From a prescriptive 
perspective, researchers study the performance of a heuristic in different environmental 
conditions, which has implications for whether decision makers should use the heuristic and 
under what conditions; from a descriptive perspective, researchers examine whether decision 
makers actually use the heuristic and if so, whether they use it adaptively, based on the 
requirements of the task environment.  
The Bias-Variance Dilemma 
That leads to the question, under what conditions will heuristics perform better than more 
complex strategies? To answer this, it is useful to begin with the distinction between risk and 
uncertainty (e.g., Knight, 1921; Savage, 1954; Simon, 1990). In a situation of risk, the exhaustive 
and mutually exclusive set of future states are known and their consequences and probability 
This is the author final version. 
Published version available from Academy of Management Journal.  
https://doi.org/10.5465/amj.2018.0172 
 
 
 10 
distribution can be foreseen with certainty. In such situations of perfect knowledge, exemplified 
by lotteries, it is true that heuristics are generally second-best. Situations of uncertainty, in 
contrast, are defined by the absence of perfect foresight, where the full set of states, their 
consequences, and/or the probabilities are not known or knowable. Optimization is by definition 
impossible here, and heuristics can outperform complex strategies that try to fine-tune on past 
data (Gigerenzer & Brighton, 2009). 
 Specifically, optimization means to select a strategy that can lead to the best outcome in 
the future. Under uncertainty, even large amounts of historical data do not guarantee that a 
strategy that was optimal in the past will also be the best in the future. For instance, Google 
researchers analyzed some 50 million search terms to build Google Flu Trends, an algorithm for 
predicting influenza-related doctor visits. Other researchers, however, showed that using a single 
variable, the number of influenza-related doctor visits two weeks ago, predicted better than 
Google’s big data algorithm (Lazer, Kennedy, King, & Vespignani, 2014). 
Many strategic, investment, entrepreneurial, personnel, and other types of managerial 
decisions have to be made under uncertainty rather than risk (Artinger et al., 2015). Decisions are 
based on models that need to predict the future (e.g., the future performance of a job candidate), 
and where there is uncertainty, there will be prediction errors. According to the bias-variance 
decomposition of prediction error (e.g., Geman, Bienenstock, & Doursat, 1992), the prediction 
error (the sum of squared error) of a model is the sum of three separate components:  
Prediction error = bias2 + variance + random error            (1).  
Bias is the average difference between a model’s predictions and the true status of an event and 
reflects how accurately a decision maker’s model represents reality. Variance is a model’s 
sensitivity to sampling error when a decision maker needs to estimate values of the model’s free 
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parameters in one sample and apply them for prediction in another sample (e.g., a manager 
develops a regression model of several cues and future job performance based on a sample of 
hired applicants and then uses the model to evaluate future applicants). Finally, random error is 
the irreducible and unavoidable error, independent of which model is used (for a more detailed 
exposition of this decomposition of prediction error, see Brighton and Gigerenzer [2012]). 
The key insight from the bias-variance analysis of prediction error is that under situations 
of uncertainty, it is difficult for a model to have both a small bias and a small variance. Variance 
tends to be larger for more complex models that have a greater number of free parameters or of 
parameters whose precise values are difficult to estimate; the bias of such a model, by contrast, 
tends to be smaller. Less complex models, including heuristics, have the opposite tendencies. For 
instance, the 1/N heuristic, with which one allocates resources equally among N options, may be 
highly biased but has zero error due to variance because it has no free parameters and does not 
need to estimate anything from the past; thus, it often predicts better than highly complex 
allocation models in finance (e.g., Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011). This trade-off between bias 
and variance is known as the “bias-variance dilemma” (Geman et al., 1992).  
 Depending on how this fundamental trade-off plays out in a specific context, heuristics can 
perform better than more complex, seemingly rational strategies, especially under situations of 
uncertainty. However, because various methods of fitting, rather than predicting, have been 
predominantly used in studies of managerial decision making, complex strategies have 
(unintentionally) been shown to be superior to heuristics. This result is unfortunate, given that in 
the real world of managerial decision making, uncertainty is arguably very common and 
predicting the future is more important than fitting to the past. 
The Δ-Inference Heuristic in Selection Decisions 
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To make the discussion more concrete, we now situate it within the context of selection 
decisions. Given the crucial role of human capital for organizational success, personnel decisions 
such as whom to hire, fire, or promote are among the most influential managerial decisions 
(Guion, 2011). Personnel selection features among the classic areas in industrial psychology, 
dating back to over a century ago (Münsterberg, 1912). Much of the research is applied, with the 
aim of helping organizations make better selection decisions, and a large amount of research has 
examined predictors of criteria such as job performance, adverse impact, and fairness 
perceptions, as well as methods to assess these (e.g., Ryan & Ployhart, 2014; Sackett & Lievens, 
2008). Based on this research, meta-analytic studies have estimated cue validities for various 
predictors of job performance. A key finding is that the upper bound of predictability is at around 
30% of the variance (Schmidt & Hunter, 1998). As such, uncertainty is rampant in this context, 
although many practitioners fail to consider it appropriately (Highhouse, 2008). 
In contrast to research on cue validities (i.e., what cues to use), research on cue integration 
(i.e., how to use cues) has received relatively little attention (Kausel et al., 2016). When there are 
multiple cues that managers could use concurrently to make a personnel decision, existing 
research has largely applied regression analysis and thus implicitly assumed that managers 
decide on the basis of a compensatory weighting-and-adding strategy. At the same time, 
however, research also suggests that actual recruitment decisions are not made in this way 
(Highhouse, 2008). All in all, personnel selection provides an ideal context for our study because 
it is among the most crucial managerial decisions, involves substantial uncertainty, and allows us 
to address the important yet poorly understood issue of the process of cue integration.  
Consistent with others, we study selection decisions between two final candidates (e.g., 
Kausel et al., 2016). Such decisions are also referred to as “paired comparisons,” in which one 
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chooses between two options on the basis of multiple relevant cues. The cues we focus on are 
three of the most commonly used and most valid predictors of job performance suggested by 
meta-analytic research (e.g., Farr & Tippins, 2010; Schmidt & Hunter, 1998): general mental 
ability (GMA), conscientiousness (CON), and structured interview performance (SIP).1 The 
standard strategy to predict a binary dependent variable is logistic regression, a method that 
considers all available cues and estimates a beta weight for each. 
A general heuristic for paired-comparison tasks is calledΔ-inference (Luan, Schooler, & 
Gigerenzer, 2014). The heuristic can be described by three rules:  
1. Search: Examine cues in the order of their importance or validities. 
2. Stopping: If the difference between a pair of options on a cue exceeds a threshold value 
Δ, then stop search. 
3. Decision: Choose the option with the higher (lower) cue value if higher (lower) cue 
values are more desirable. If no difference exceeds Δ for all cues, then restart 
the search from the first cue and make a decision as soon as any difference is 
found between the options (i.e., setting Δ to zero). 
Unlike logistic regression, the Δ-inference heuristic is lexicographic. This means that the 
process is sequential, searching cues one after another instead of considering all cues at once. It 
is also noncompensatory, meaning that a decision is made based on the cue that stops search and 
subsequent cues in the search hierarchy have no effect on the decision, that is, their values cannot 
compensate for the values of the decisive cue. Finally, the heuristic is frugal, meaning that on 
                                                 
1 We acknowledge that there are other valid cues, such as work samples, biodata, and integrity tests, and that cues 
used in practice often depend on the stage in the selection process. However, to reduce the complexity of the 
investigation carried out in the three studies reported in this article, we decided to limit our attention to these three 
cues. Also, because our interest is in cue integration, we do not discuss the methods used to generate cue values and 
present cue values as given in the simulations (Study 2) and to our research participants (Study 3). 
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average, it looks up fewer cues than are available.  
Lexicographic heuristics have been studied in several areas of decision making, including 
consumer behavior and risky choices (e.g., Bettman, Johnson, & Payne, 1990; Kohli & Jedidi, 
2007; Tversky, 1969), and the evidence generally shows that people often make decisions in 
such a sequential, noncompensatory manner. Luan and colleagues (2014) found that Δ-inference 
led to the same level of predictive accuracy as did regression and other complex models in 39 
real-world tasks, such as predicting which professor earns a higher salary or which car has a 
better fuel efficiency. However, no studies have examined Δ-inference in managerial decisions.  
An Illustration  
Logistic regression and Δ-inference are prototypical examples of “rational” and heuristic 
strategies for paired-comparison decisions. Let us illustrate how they may be used with a specific 
example. Imagine that a manager must make a hiring decision. After several rounds of screening, 
the top two candidates are left. In an effort to practice evidence-based management, our manager 
considers a set of valid cues that predict future job performance (FJP) of these two candidates: 
their GMA, CON, and SIP scores, each of which correlates positively with FJP. Figure 1 (taken 
from Study 3) shows their scores on these cues: Clearly, no candidate dominates the other. How 
should the manager integrate these cues to arrive at a decision? 
--- Figure 1 around here --- 
From the perspective of “more information is always better,” the prevailing view of 
managerial rationality would suggest a compensatory weighting-and-adding strategy such as 
logistic regression because it considers all information, allows for trade-offs among cue values, 
and maximizes. In this process, our manager would try to derive the weight of each cue, multiply 
the weight by the value of the cue, add up the products across all cues, and select the candidate 
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with the higher score. If, in contrast, our manager uses Δ-inference, cue use would be sequential 
and noncompensatory. Assuming that the manager ranks cues based on their validities derived 
from a meta-analysis, GMA would be considered first. If the difference in GMA score between 
the two candidates is deemed sufficiently large (i.e., surpasses the difference threshold), the 
manager would choose the candidate with the higher score, without even considering the other 
two cues. Only when the difference is smaller than the threshold would the manager move on to 
consider the next-ranked cue, and so on.   
Logistic regression and Δ-inference are at the center of our investigations carried out in 
three studies. We now describe these studies, including the goal, predictions, and results of each.  
STUDY 1 
 In this study, we compared the prediction performances of  Δ-inference and logistic 
regression in a real-world data set, a common approach in research investigating ecological 
rationality (e.g., Czerlinski, Goldstein, & Gigerenzer, 1999; Luan et al., 2014; Marewski & 
Schooler, 2011). The goal was to examine whether managers using the fast-and-frugal Δ- 
heuristic would make selection decisions that are as good as—or even better than—those of 
managers using logistic regression. In addition, Study 1 provided an initial exploration of the role 
of task environment with respect to learning opportunities. Our expectation was that Δ-inference 
would predict better when learning opportunities are limited, resulting in greater uncertainty in 
the task.  
Methods 
Data set. The data set was taken from Study 1 in Kausel et al. (2016) and includes data 
from 236 actual applicants at an airline company. Each applicant did GMA and CON 
assessments and received an unstructured interview performance (USIP) score by a line 
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manager. All applicants in this data set were eventually hired and were assessed by their 
supervisors on their overall job performance approximately three months later. Table 1 shows the 
key statistical properties of the four relevant variables, FJP, GMA, CON, and USIP. Among the 
236 individuals in the data set, there were 25 unique values in FJP. By exhausting all pairs of 
individuals with different FJP scores—so that the correctness of a paired-comparison decision 
could be unambiguously established—we ended up with a total of 50,334 pairs. These pairs 
served as the database from which random samples were drawn in our subsequent analyses. 
--- Table 1 around here --- 
Model testing and strategy performance. To measure a strategy’s performance, we used 
cross-validation to assess its accuracy in predicting which of two job candidates will have a 
better FJP score and thus should be hired. Cross-validation is one of the most commonly applied 
model-testing methods in statistics, machine learning, and cognitive sciences (e.g., Czerlinski et 
al., 1999; Geisser, 1993; Stone, 1974). Operationally, in a sample consisting of n cases (e.g., 
paired comparisons), a certain proportion are used to “train” a model, estimating the model’s free 
parameters (e.g., the beta weights in logistic regression), and the remaining cases are used to 
“test” the model’s prediction accuracy (e.g., how often it chooses the better job candidate), with 
parameter values learned from the training cases.  
Δ-inference and logistic regression needed to learn, or estimate, very different sets of 
parameters. For Δ-inference, the parameters were cue search order, which was estimated by 
calculating the bivariate correlations between the three cues and the decisions and then ordering 
the correlations by their absolute magnitudes (Luan et al., 2014), and the three threshold values, 
one for each cue; thus, adding up to four parameters in total. For logistic regression, we assumed 
no interactions among the three cues, meaning that there were also four parameters to be 
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estimated: the beta weights for the three cues and an intercept term. 
Learning opportunities. We varied learning opportunities in two ways. First, there are 
many ways to conduct cross-validation, depending on how training and testing cases are split in a 
sample. We applied three splits in this study: 50-50, 60-40, and 80-20, in which 50%, 60%, and 
80% of a sample were used respectively for training. Second, we tested the strategies with three 
sample sizes: 30, 100, and 1,000, which represent situations where learning opportunities are 
generally few, moderate, and abundant, respectively. In each sample, the three splits of cross-
validation were applied, resulting in a 3 × 3 factorial design with learning opportunities ranging 
from 15 cases (50% of 30) to 800 (80% of 1,000). To obtain reliable results on performance of 
the two strategies, 10,000 random samples were drawn from the paired-comparison database in 
the n = 30 and n = 100 conditions, whereas 1,000 were drawn for the n = 1,000 condition.  
In general, our analysis can be situated in the context in which a manager first tries to learn 
the parameters of a model by observing or making a number of decisions with feedback and then 
proceeds to apply the model to make more decisions without feedback. We essentially tested and 
compared the predictive accuracy of two types of managers, one using logistic regression and the 
other using Δ-inference. In nine learning conditions, we examined which manager would predict 
more accurately in the real-world data set investigated in this study.   
Results and Discussion 
Figure 2 shows the prediction accuracy of Δ-inference and logistic regression in each 
(sample size) × (training proportion) condition. Two general patterns can be observed: (1) each 
strategy became more accurate when provided with more learning opportunities in terms of both 
a larger sample size and a higher proportion of training cases, and (2) Δ-inference achieved 
higher prediction accuracy than did logistic regression in all conditions. The difference between 
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the two strategies was especially pronounced when there were generally few opportunities for 
learning and decreased as learning opportunities became more abundant.  
--- Figure 2 around here --- 
Despite the all-around superior predictive accuracy of Δ-inference, one should note that 
neither strategy predicted well: Even with many opportunities for learning, the highest prediction 
accuracy remained below 63%. This certainly has something to do with the relatively low 
predictive validities of the three cues in the data set (Table 1) and is consistent with meta-
analytic evidence suggesting that FJP is very difficult to predict (e.g., Schmidt & Hunter, 1998).    
In addition to being more accurate in prediction, Δ-inference on average searched fewer 
than 1.5 cues to make a decision, compared to all three cues used by logistic regression, and the 
fewer the learning opportunities, the fewer cues it searched. This result is highly relevant to 
practice because assessing job applicants’ GMA, CON, and especially USIP is costly and time-
consuming. In the data set studied here, USIP had the lowest validity and was rarely searched by 
Δ-inference. Thus, using Δ-inference would not only lead to higher predictive accuracy but also 
save managers cost and time, making it a better strategy across the board2.  
In sum, in an ecologically valid, real-world data set, Study 1 provides an existence proof 
that Δ-inference can lead to better decisions than logistic regression while searching less 
information (i.e., “less is more”). The performance advantage of the heuristic was particularly 
large under conditions of high uncertainty due to limited learning opportunities (i.e., smaller 
                                                 
2 The detailed frugality, cue search, and additional model-testing results can be found in the Supplementary 
Materials. Because the validity of USIP was so low in this data set, we tested Δ-inference and logistic regression 
with only the GMA and CON cues. The two-cue models did have higher predictive accuracy when sample size was 
small; however, the improvements were generally limited and Δ-inference stood to benefit even more than logistic 
regression. Lastly, we ran three popular machine learning algorithms, LASSO regression, random forest, and 
support vector machine (SVM), in our data set. None of the three algorithms predicted more accurately than Δ-
inference in any of the learning conditions. These results show that for tasks of high uncertainty, even top-of-the-line 
machine learning algorithms may not outperform simple heuristics. We thank two anonymous reviewers for 
suggesting these additional analyses. 
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sample sizes and fewer training trials), conditions that are common to many personnel selection 
decisions and real-world managerial decisions in general.  
STUDY 2 
 The goal of Study 2 was to examine in more detail the ecological conditions under which 
Δ-inference is likely to outperform logistic regression, and vice versa. Based on the bias-variance 
analysis of prediction error, we made the following two predictions on the relative performance 
of the two strategies: 
1. The smaller the sample size, the larger the relative advantage of Δ-inference. Sample 
size affects the variance component of prediction error in that the smaller the sample 
size, the larger the error due to variance. However, this is typically less of a problem 
for lexicographic heuristics than for models that try to integrate all available 
information (e.g., Brighton & Gigerenzer, 2012). 
2. The more skewed the distribution of cue validities, the larger the relative advantage of 
Δ-inference. Lexicographic heuristics, including Δ-inference, often rely on only the 
first cue to decide. If the first cue is substantially more useful than others, then with 
regard to the bias component of prediction error, Δ-inference and logistic regression 
will be similarly biased (e.g., Gigerenzer, 2016; Martignon & Hoffrage, 1999). This 
will increase the overall advantage of Δ-inference, which generally has less variance 
than logistic regression.   
Besides sample size and distribution of cue validities, we also investigated the effects of 
two other environmental properties, described further below. These ecological investigations 
were carried out in 1,728 simulated task environments, and the statistical parameters in those 
environments (i.e., cue validities and intercue correlations) were chosen according to the results 
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of a meta-analytic study of personnel selection (Bobko, Roth, & Potosky, 1999).  
Methods  
Task environments. The task in each simulated environment was to choose which of two 
job candidates would have better FJP based on the candidates’ scores on GMA, CON, and 
standardized interview performance (SIP). Unlike Study 1, we used SIP here because of its 
higher validity for predicting job performance (Schmidt & Hunter, 1998).  
Table 2 shows a correlation matrix that contains the values of six parameters critical to a 
simulated environment: the validity of each cue (a, b, and c) and the intercue correlations (d, e, 
and f). These values were taken from Table 1 reported in a meta-analysis study by Bobko and 
colleagues (1999). The last column in Table 2 lists the parameter values we used to construct the 
simulated environments. There were four levels for each cue validity parameter: its meta-analytic 
value, the plus and minus .10 of this value, and a fixed value of .05 that renders the cue close to 
being useless (similar to USIP in the Study 1 data set). For each intercue correlation parameter, 
three levels were included: its meta-analytic value and the plus and minus .10 of this value. A 
total of 1,728 combinations can be formed with these parameter levels, and each combination 
provided values on the basis of which parameters of a simulated environment were set.    
--- Table 2 around here --- 
Each simulated environment was specified by a multivariate Normal distribution with four 
variables, a criterion (FJP) and three cues (GMA, CON, and SIP). The variance of each variable 
was set to 1, and the six pairwise correlations among the four variables were given by one of the 
1,728 combinations of parameter values. To create a sample of n paired comparisons, we first 
randomly drew 2n cases (i.e., job candidates) from the multivariate Normal distribution and then 
paired the ith case (i = 1 to n) with the (i + n)th one. Whichever of the pair had a higher criterion 
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value was the correct choice. Environments simulated with this procedure are linear, meaning 
that the best model for predicting the criterion should be a linear combination of the cues 
(Hogarth & Karelaia, 2007). Therefore, a linear strategy such as logistic regression should have 
an inherent advantage, however small, over nonlinear ones with respect to the bias component of 
prediction error (i.e., be less biased).  
Environmental properties. We varied four environmental properties. The first is sample 
size, which limits the amount of learning available to a decision maker to estimate a strategy’s 
free parameters and directly affects the variance component of prediction error. The second is the 
distribution of cue validities. Two types were distinguished: (a) J-shaped (coded as “1”), where 
the highest cue validity ρ1 is higher than the other two to the extent that ρ1 > (ρ2 + ρ3), and (b) not 
J-shaped (coded as “0”), where validities are distributed otherwise. As described above, we 
predicted that, relative to logistic regression, Δ-inference should perform better when sample size 
is small and in environments where the distribution of cue validities is J-shaped.  
The third property is linear predictability, which is defined as the R2 of the best linear 
regression in an environment and is a critical environmental property to a lens model analysis 
(e.g., Cooksey, 1996). We measured linear predictability by first simulating 1,000,000 cases in 
an environment and then getting the R2 of the linear regression that used the three cues as 
predictors of the criterion variable. Because each environment was linear in this study, linear 
predictability represents how predictable an environment was when the theoretically best model 
was used. Hogarth and Karelaia (2007) showed that the performance of both linear and nonlinear 
strategies increases in environments with higher linear predictabilities but that the direction of 
their relative performance is ambiguous.  
Finally, we varied the best cue’s relative predictiveness, which is the ratio between the R2 
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of a linear regression using only the best cue and the linear predictability in an environment. It 
represents the amount of information contained in the best cue relative to others and should be 
higher in J-shaped environments and in environments where intercue correlations are higher. 
When the best cue’s relative predictiveness is higher, Δ-inference does not need to search much 
further beyond the best cue to reach a decision (Luan et al., 2014); however, as with higher linear 
predictability, it is unclear how different types of strategies would perform relative to each other 
in such environments.  
Of the four properties, sample size does not depend on the statistical characteristics of a 
simulated environment, whereas the other three do and their values vary across environments. 
Among these three properties, distribution of cue validities is highly correlated with relative 
predictiveness of the best cue (r = .73) and negatively correlated with linear predictability (r = 
−.26), which is also negatively correlated with the best cue’s relative predictiveness (r = −.32). 
Model testing. As in Study 1, we tested the predictive accuracy of logistic regression and 
Δ-inference using cross-validation in three sample-size conditions: 30, 100, and 1,000. However, 
instead of testing different proportions of training cases in a sample, we applied a fixed 60-40 
split in this study. In each environment, the two strategies’ performances were based on 10,000 
random samples in the n = 30 and n = 100 conditions and 1,000 in the n = 1,000 condition.  
Because we tested only two strategies and were concerned exclusively with their relative 
performance in this study, the main measure we assessed is the relative frequency of logistic 
regression predicting better than Δ-inference across all samples in a sample-size condition. For 
example, there were 10,000 samples in the n = 100 condition. In a specific environment, suppose 
that the prediction accuracy of logistic regression was higher than that of Δ-inference in 5,000 
samples, lower in 4,000, and tied with it in the other 1,000 samples. The relative frequency was 
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calculated by adding half of the frequency when the two were tied to the frequency that logistic 
regression was truly better. In the above example, it is then .50 + .50  .10 = .55. 
Results and Discussion 
Table 3 shows the mean relative frequency of logistic regression predicting better than Δ-
inference across all simulated environments in each sample-size condition. When sample sizes 
were smaller (i.e., 30 and 100), the mean frequencies were below .50 (.44 and .49, respectively), 
meaning that logistic regression on average predicted less accurately than Δ-inference when 
learning opportunities were limited, consistent with our finding in Study 1. When sample size 
was very large (i.e., 1,000), the performance of each strategy approximated its maximum level; 
there, logistic regression finally became the generally more predictive model (mean relative 
frequency = .65)3. Overall, the results support our prediction that Δ-inference should perform 
relatively better when sample size is small and learning opportunities are limited.  
--- Table 3 around here --- 
Table 3 also shows how the other three environmental properties affected the strategies’ 
relative performance. First, on average, the relative frequency of logistic regression predicting 
better than Δ-inference was lower in J-shaped environments, although the difference became 
smaller as sample size declined. This result generally supports our prediction regarding the effect 
of cue validity distribution.  
Second, because both linear predictability and relative predictiveness of the best cue are 
continuous variables, we calculated the bivariate correlation between each and the relative 
                                                 
3 This result was expected because all the environments are linear and linear models should predict best, given 
enough learning. We also simulated some environments in which decisions were outcomes of a lexicographic 
process of the three cues. There, Δ-inference outperformed logistic regression regardless of the sample size, and its 
relative advantage was influenced by the threshold value set in each cue to stop searching, the amount of random 
noise on the thresholds, and the pairwise correlations among the cues. A description of these environments and a 
summary of the results of our ecological analysis can be found in the Supplementary Materials. 
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frequency of logistic regression predicting better4. In each sample size condition, the correlation 
was negative for the best cue’s relative predictiveness, suggesting that when useful information 
concentrated more in the best cue, logistic regression tended to perform relatively worse than Δ-
inference. In contrast, the correlation was positive for linear predictability, indicating that when 
FJP was more predictable by a linear combination of the three cues, logistic regression tended to 
perform relatively better. Figure 3 displays the scatter plots of the relative frequency of logistic 
regression predicting better against these two properties in the n = 100 condition.    
--- Figure 3 around here --- 
The last column of Table 3 reports the mean frugality of Δ-inference (i.e., average number 
of cues searched) across all environments in each sample-size condition. It shows that Δ-
inference not only searched on average less than half of the available cues but also searched 
fewer cues when sample size was smaller, consistent with our findings in Study 1. We think that 
this is a “smart” way for Δ-inference to deal with the high level of noise in small sample 
situations. Specifically, sparse learning makes it difficult for Δ-inference to estimate exact cue 
validity values and then the correct cue search orders. Paradoxically, this does not hinder—and 
sometimes even facilitates—its ability to identify the best cue (e.g., Katsikopoulos, Schooler, & 
Hertwig, 2010; Şimşek & Buckmann, 2015). To reduce overall error, Δ-inference can thus set a 
small threshold on the best cue, relying more on it to make decisions and searching less.  
In summary, we conducted an analysis of the ecological rationality of Δ-inference and 
logistic regression in 1,728 simulated task environments, whose parameters cover what is likely 
to be encountered in real-world personnel selection tasks. Consistent with our predictions, we 
                                                 
4 We also calculated the correlation of each property when controlling for other properties. Values of these partial 
correlations differed only slightly from those of the bivariate correlations, and the pattern of results remains the 
same as the one shown in Table 3. 
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found that, relative to logistic regression, Δ-inference predicts better when sample size is smaller 
and the distribution of cue validities is skewed (J-shaped). Explorations of two other 
environmental properties show that Δ-inference is more likely to outperform logistic regression 
when the best cue is particularly useful, whereas the opposite tends to occur when the linear 
predictability of a task is higher. Furthermore, despite the linearity of all the environments, 
which imposes a handicap on Δ-inference, Δ-inference on average predicted more accurately 
than logistic regression except when sample size was very large and did so by searching less than 
half of the available cues. This provides another demonstration of the “less-is-more effect” and 
further evidence that Δ-inference is a useful and effective heuristic for personnel selection and 
potentially other managerial decisions.  
STUDY 3 
Results of Studies 1 and 2 suggest that under many circumstances, managers should use the 
Δ-inference heuristic rather than logistic regression to predict which of two job applicants will 
show better future job performance. Extending these findings, we now turn our focus from 
prescription to description, examining actual decision processes in an experimental setting. In the 
experiment, participants made a series of selection decisions similar to those in Studies 1 and 2. 
We asked them to decide on candidates for two job positions using a within-subjects design, 
which allowed us to test how frequently their strategies were consistent with Δ-inference or 
logistic regression in each condition, whether they adjusted their strategies to the features of a 
task, and how they might switch strategies between conditions. 
Unlike in the previous two studies, participants’ decisions made in this study could not be 
judged as right or wrong; thus, it was impossible to judge whether their strategies were 
ecologically rational or not. Even so, we measured participants’ previous experience in selection 
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decisions, expecting that the more experienced ones would behave more similarly to an 
ecologically rational or adaptive decision maker. Some previous studies have shown that more 
experienced decision makers tend to adopt heuristics more frequently (e.g., Luan & Reb, 2017; 
Pachur & Marinello, 2013; Wegwarth et al., 2009) and apply strategies more selectively across 
different task conditions (e.g., Rieskamp & Otto, 2006). Whether this would hold in the present 
study was an important question in our investigation and could provide clues as to what adaptive 
behaviors would look like when managers use Δ-inference or logistic regression. 
Methods    
Participants. In order to have sufficient variation in selection decision experience, we 
recruited three groups of students at a management university in Southeast Asia: (1) first- or 
second-year undergraduates who were taking introductory management courses (N = 101), (2) 
third- or fourth-year undergraduates majoring in organizational behavior and human resources 
and taking a course on personnel selection (N = 37), and (3) part-time master’s students in a 
master of human capital leadership program with typically five or more years of working 
experience in an HR function (N = 28). Undergraduate students participated in exchange for 
partial course credit, whereas master students received no credit. Given that experience with 
selection decisions varied substantially within each participant group and the uneven group sizes, 
we collapsed data across the three groups and used self-reported experience rather than data 
source as the grouping variable.  
 Out of the 166 participants, 23 were excluded from data analysis for one or more of the 
following reasons: (1) answering “no, because I was distracted and did not pay full attention” to 
the question “in your honest opinion, should we include your responses in our study?” that was 
asked at the end of the experiment (N = 11); (2) taking less than 15 minutes to complete the 
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experiment, which we consider abnormally short (N = 4); and (3) not selecting the job candidate 
who scored better than the other on all three cues more than once (N = 10). Our final sample thus 
consisted of 143 participants (85 female, 59.4%) with a mean age of 24.2 (SD = 6.5).  
Design and procedure. Participants were informed that the purpose of this study was to 
understand how people make recruiting decisions based on their judgments of candidates’ 
qualifications. They were instructed to assume the role of an HR manager in a multinational 
corporation and were provided with information on job candidates’ GMA, CON, and SIP scores. 
They were asked to make decisions on the basis of these cues with the assumption that the two 
candidates scored similarly on all other relevant qualifications and characteristics.  
A within-subjects design was applied: Each participant was asked to recruit for two 
different positions: data analyst (a more complex job) and receptionist (a less complex job). In 
each job condition, participants were instructed to read a description of the required 
responsibilities for the position before engaging in 105 paired-comparison decisions one by one. 
The description was a minimally edited version of a real job description for either a data analyst 
or a receptionist position posted in a popular job search website and can be found in Appendix A. 
After making their decisions, participants were asked to judge the importance of each cue for 
hiring the best person for the position, doing so by distributing 99 points among the three cues. 
After that, they moved on to make decisions for the second position and then again judged cue 
importance. The orders of the two job conditions were randomized for each participant.  
Materials. In each experimental trial, participants viewed two job candidates’ scores on 
GMA, CON, and SIP side-by-side and were asked to select the one they preferred to hire (see a 
sample display in Figure 1). A brief definition of each cue was provided and could be seen on 
screen in each trial. Presentation orders of the cues were first determined randomly and then 
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remained fixed throughout the whole experimental session for each participant; the cue values 
were generated by a computer program. In the receptionist condition, the program drew values 
from three Normal distributions, whose means and standard deviations were 100 and 15 for 
GMA, 50 and 10 for CON, and 3.65 and 0.52 for SIP; the intercue correlations were set to 0 
between GMA and CON, 0.24 between GMA and SIP, and 0.12 between CON and SIP. These 
parameter values were adopted from results reported in the literature (Bobko et al., 1999; 
McCrae, Martin, & Costa Jr., 2005; Roth, Switzer, Van Iddekinge, & Oh, 2011). In the analyst 
condition, the only difference was that the mean was 120 instead of 100 on GMA (Schmidt & 
Hunter, 2004). Information on the mean, the lowest, and the highest scores of each cue was also 
displayed on screen in each trial.  
In each condition, we created 105 pairs of candidates using the computer program. Among 
them, 100 were results of pairing 100 program-generated candidates with another 100, and five 
were created so that one candidate dominated the other, that is, had better values on all three 
cues. Participants’ decisions in these five pairs provided one way for us to check whether they 
had paid attention in the experiment. After creating the 105 pairs, five and 100 were selected 
respectively to make up the practice and experimental trials; the display orders of the pairs in 
each block were randomized for each participant.   
Measures. Participants’ choices and reaction times in each trial were recorded. At the end 
of each experimental condition, we asked participants for their ratings on the importance of each 
cue for a position, and at the end of the experimental session, besides requesting demographic 
information, we asked participants whether they had ever been in a position to formally recruit 
others as part of their job and in how many selection decisions they had previously been involved 
(1: 0-3; 2: 4-12; 3: 13-24; 4: 25-36; 5: >36). Finally, participants were asked whether they 
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thought their responses in the experiment should be included in our analyses.  
Model testing. To test which strategy—logistic regression or Δ-inference—a participant 
was more likely to adopt in an experimental condition, we applied the same method as used in 
Luan and Reb (2017). As in Studies 1 and 2, cross-validation was core to this method. However, 
in addition to investigating the accuracy of each model’s predictions of a participant’s choices, 
we also considered the model’s predictions of a participant’s reaction times (RT). In essence, the 
method is a modified version of the multiple-measure maximum likelihood method by Glöckner 
(2009) and tested how well each model could predict a participant’s choice and RT, by 
estimating the conditional likelihood of the data given the model.  
In the 100 decisions made by a participant in an experimental condition, we estimated 
parameters of logistic regression and Δ-inference in the first 60 trials (i.e., the training cases) and 
examined the models’ predictions in the next 40 trials (i.e., the testing cases). The models were 
compared in terms of their maximum likelihoods. For logistic regression, seven parameters were 
estimated: four linear terms (i.e., three beta weights and the intercept term), one error rate in 
applying the model, and two parameters for RTs (i.e., the mean and standard deviation). For Δ-
inference, eight were estimated: cue order, threshold values on the three cues, error rate, and 
three RT parameters (i.e., mean, standard deviation, and a scaling parameter). Rationales for why 
parameters for error rate and RTs were needed can be found in Glöckner (2009). 
Model testing and comparison were always conducted at the individual level. For each 
participant and in each experimental condition, we identified the model that had the larger 
maximum likelihood in prediction as the one more likely adopted by the participant. 
Results and Discussion 
Reaction times. We started our analysis by inspecting participants’ RTs and found that it 
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sometimes took participants an exceptionally long or brief time to complete a trial. To reduce the 
effects of these trials on our analyses, we calculated the mean and standard deviation (SD) of 
each participant’s RTs across all trials in an experimental condition and replaced RTs longer and 
shorter than 2.5SDs with mean plus and minus 2.5SD, respectively. The mean and SD of a 
participant’s RTs were re-calculated after this treatment. Table 4 shows the percentage of 
abnormal RT trials, the mean RT, and the SD of RT, all averaged over all participants, in each 
experimental condition5.  
--- Table 4 around here --- 
Cue importance. How important was each cue to the participants when they made hiring 
decisions? Table 4 shows the average ranks of the three cues based on participants’ subjective 
ratings of cue importance for each job position. By this aggregate measure, the orders were 
CON > SIP > GMA for the receptionist position and GMA > CON > SIP for the analyst position. 
They are consistent with results from model testing (see Supplementary Materials) and show that 
the importance of GMA depended heavily on the job position: It was the most important cue for 
the more complex analyst position but the least important cue for the less complex receptionist 
position. Meanwhile, CON was deemed as an overall important cue for both positions.  
Did participants use Δ-inference and under what conditions? The last rows of Table 4 
show the proportions of participants who were classified as using either Δ-inference or logistic 
regression. In the receptionist condition, almost half (49%) used Δ-inference, but that proportion 
dropped to 38% for the more complex analyst condition. Thus, many participants did adopt Δ-
                                                 
5 To test how robust our model-testing results are against abnormal RTs, we analyzed our data without the RT 
treatment. The results that match Figures 4 and 5 reported below can be found in the Supplementary Materials. In 
general, leaving abnormal RTs untreated affected some aspects of the results, albeit without changing the main 
conclusions of our study. We also performed robustness checks on our main results by adding back the excluded 
participants’ data. These results can also be found in the Supplementary Materials. 
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inference to make decisions, but their preference for the strategy depended on the job position.  
To further understand their strategy selections, we divided participants into two categories 
using the median of previous experience: those who had been involved in four or more selection 
decisions (N = 64) and those who had been involved in fewer (N = 79). Moreover, within each 
job condition, we distinguished two types of participants by the distribution of their subjective 
ratings of cue importance: those with skewed ratings such that the highest rating was more than 
the sum of the other two, that is, r1 > (r2 + r3), and those with more equal ratings, that is, r1 ≤ (r2 
+ r3). A skewed distribution here is the subjective version of a J-shaped environment in Study 2; 
participants with such a distribution were in the minority in both the receptionist and the analyst 
conditions: N = 30 and 33, respectively. Figure 4 shows the proportion of participants classified 
as using Δ-inference in each (experience) × (cue rating distribution) category for each condition.   
--- Figure 4 around here --- 
Study 2 indicated that a J-shaped distribution of cue validities is an environment condition 
under which Δ-inference has a relative performance advantage over logistic regression. Figure 4 
shows that a higher proportion of participants were classified as using Δ-inference when the 
distributions of their cue importance ratings were skewed, a result that held for both the less and 
the more experienced participants—and particularly so for the latter—in both job conditions. 
This suggests that our participants were more likely to use Δ-inference when the heuristic was a 
prescriptively better strategy than logistic regression.  
Figure 4 also shows that a higher proportion of the more experienced participants were 
classified as using Δ-inference, and this was the case in both job conditions and regardless of 
whether participants’ cue importance distributions were skewed or not. This result is consistent 
with previous findings that the use of heuristics is often positively related to experience in a 
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domain and experts are more likely than novices to use heuristics (e.g., Garcia-Retamero & 
Dhami, 2009; Wegwarth et al., 2009). Furthermore, of all the participants, those with more 
experience and a skewed cue importance distribution adopted Δ-inference most frequently, 
whereas those with less experience and a more equal distribution adopted it least frequently. This 
suggests that the effects of experience and cue importance distribution on strategy selection 
could be additive. 
Finally, we ran a logistic regression with a participant’s classified strategy as the predicted 
variable and the participant’s experience and type of subjective cue importance distribution as 
the predictors in each job condition. The results show that in both conditions, the beta weight of 
experience was statistically significant or close to significant (p = .046 and p = .082 for the 
receptionist and the analyst conditions, respectively). However, the beta weight of subjective cue 
importance distribution was not statistically significant in the receptionist condition (p = .261) 
but close to significant in the analyst condition (p = .057). The relatively small number of 
“skewed” participants in each condition might contribute to the nonsignificant results.  
Experience and strategy switching. The within-subjects design of this study allowed us to 
examine whether and how participants switched strategies between the two job conditions. 
Figure 5 shows the rates of strategy switching from the receptionist condition to the analyst 
condition for the less and the more experienced participants. For both, more switched from Δ-
inference to logistic regression than vice versa (recall that logistic regression was the more 
common strategy for the more complex analyst position). However, only a minority (33%) of the 
less experienced switched, whereas the majority (53%) of the more experienced did so. It is 
difficult to know exactly why the more experienced switched strategies more frequently. It is 
possible that through learning, they better understood the requirements of each job position and 
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became more discerning as to how information in the cues should be integrated, leading to a 
more selective adoption of strategies. This pattern has also been observed in studies where the 
accuracy of decisions can be firmly established (e.g., Rieskamp & Otto, 2006).  
--- Figure 5 around here --- 
In sum, the results of Study 3 show that participants adopted both heuristic and weighting-
and-adding strategies when making paired-comparison decisions in personnel selection and 
many of them adopted qualitatively different strategies in different task conditions. The results 
also suggest that participants were sensitive to a crucial condition for the ecological rationality of 
Δ-inference: a skewed (J-shaped) distribution of cue importance or validities. Specifically, 
participants, especially the more experienced ones, were more likely to use Δ-inference when 
they judged one cue to be much more important for the hiring decision than other cues. 
Moreover, compared to the less experienced participants, those with more experience were 
generally more likely to adopt the heuristic and switched strategies more frequently between job 
conditions. If the behavior of the more experienced is indeed closer to that of an ecologically 
rational, adaptive manager, then that manager would be more selective with regard to which 
strategy to use under which condition and more inclined to use the Δ-inference heuristic, 
particularly when deeming one cue as much more important or informative than others.  
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
A widely-held view in management research and teaching is that heuristics are inferior to 
“rational” strategies. Under the influence of the heuristics and biases program (Gilovich et al., 
2002; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), much management research has focused on how heuristics 
can lead to pernicious biases in areas such as performance appraisal, negotiation, personnel 
selection, portfolio investment, and strategy (e.g., Bazerman & Moore, 2008; Highhouse et al., 
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2013). It has been assumed that managers use heuristics because of their cognitive limitations or 
because of heuristics’ advantage in saving search and processing costs, not because they can lead 
to more accurate decisions. Viewing heuristics from the perspective of ecological rationality, the 
present research challenges these assumptions and argues that under conditions of uncertainty, 
heuristics can lead to more accurate managerial decisions than rational strategies do while using 
less information; that is, less can actually be more. 
Situating our studies within the context of personnel selection decisions, we compared Δ-
inference, a fast-and-frugal heuristic, to logistic regression, a compensatory strategy that weights 
and adds all available information. In Study 1, we analyzed data from 236 applicants at an airline 
company and showed that Δ-inference was better than logistic regression at predicting which of 
two applicants would have superior future job performance. This effect held in all conditions 
(Figure 2) and was particularly strong when sample sizes were small. Study 1 thus provides an 
existence proof that a heuristic strategy can lead to more accurate predictions and decisions in a 
real-world personnel selection task.  
Ecological rationality implies that the performance of a strategy depends on its fit to the 
task environment. In Study 2, we examined the effects of four environmental properties on the 
relative performance of logistic regression and Δ-inference in 1,728 simulated environments. 
Despite all environments being linear, we found that logistic regression performed worse than Δ-
inference under a substantial set of conditions. In general, Δ-inference was more likely to predict 
better than logistic regression when (1) learning opportunities were limited, (2) one cue was 
substantially more informative than other cues, and (3) the criterion variable (i.e., future job 
performance) was less predictable by a linear model of cues.  
Finally, we conducted an experiment in Study 3 to examine whether participants use Δ-
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inference and whether and how they adapt their strategies to the characteristics of the task. The 
analyses showed that many participants did adopt the heuristic and that participants tended to do 
so more often when they judged one cue as being much more important than the other cues, a 
condition identified in Study 2 as ecologically beneficial for Δ-inference. Both tendencies were 
particularly strong for participants with more experience in personnel selection.  
Overall, findings from our studies are not consistent with the notion that heuristics are 
generally inferior, or second-best, to more complex strategies in managerial decision making. 
Instead, under conditions common in managerial decisions, heuristics can perform well and 
better than complex strategies, and decision makers seem to be sensitive to some of these 
conditions, using heuristics adaptively. 
 Our research makes several theoretical contributions. Most importantly, we introduce 
ecological rationality as a vision of managerial rationality. Economic rationality considers logic, 
probability theory, and maximization as the universal standards for good managerial decision 
making. Managers who violate these standards by using heuristics are often viewed as biased 
decision makers. Taking ecological rationality as a basis, we propose a more positive view on 
managerial heuristics: In addition to saving search and processing costs, using fast-and-frugal 
heuristics can also result in more effective and higher-quality decisions. We also propose a more 
balanced view on strategies traditionally thought of as “rational,” in that taking more information 
into consideration does not guarantee better decisions in situations of uncertainty. Our view is 
consistent with work on managerial intuition that rejects economic rationality as the universal 
standard (Dane & Pratt, 2007; Hodgkinson et al., 2009), albeit from a very different theoretical 
and methodological perspective.    
Ecological rationality posits that the effectiveness of any strategy, heuristic or otherwise, 
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depends on its fit to the task environment. We found that Δ-inference worked particularly well 
under conditions of uncertainty that are common in many managerial decision environments. 
This confirms recent research findings that managers use simple rules to make effective strategic 
decisions in tasks of great uncertainty (Bingham & Eisenhardt, 2011; Davis et al., 2009). 
Moreover, by emphasizing ecological fit, we move the conversation towards a contingency 
theory of managerial decision making. Similar to contingency theories of leadership, which 
argue that the effectiveness of a leadership style depends on the situation (Fiedler, 1964; Vroom 
& Jago, 2007), such a theory posits that there is no single best decision strategy and managers 
should use multiple strategies adaptively rather than relying on just one. The imperative for 
future research is to uncover these contingencies in managerial decision making. 
Research on ecological rationality has already shed light on some of the general 
contingencies. In particular, as opposed to the assumption of a general accuracy-effort trade-off 
(Payne et al, 1993), ecological rationality emphasizes the distinction between uncertainty and 
risk and the resulting bias-variance trade-off (Brighton & Gigerenzer, 2012; Geman et al., 1992). 
Variance represents the sensitivity of a strategy to samples (or idiosyncratic learning 
experiences), and bias reflects the extent to which the strategy departs from reality. Due to 
uncertainty, simpler strategies tend to have a larger bias but a smaller variance than those of 
more complex strategies. Thus, the challenge in strategy selection is to strike a good trade-off 
between bias (complexity) and variance (simplicity). Lexicographic heuristics such as Δ-
inference can reduce variance because of their simplicity, and if the distribution of cue validities 
is highly skewed, then they and a linear rule are similarly biased (Martignon & Hoffrage, 2002). 
Therefore, a manager working on tasks with this property can make more frugal and more 
accurate decisions by using lexicographic heuristics than by compensatorily weighting and 
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adding all available information. 
Our research also contributes to the literature on process models of managerial decision 
making (Luan & Reb, 2017). As-if models (Friedman, 1953), such as expected utility theory, 
prospect theory, or inequity aversion theory, are popular models of managerial decision making; 
however, they are meant to model the outcomes, not the process. Furthermore, many studies of 
managerial heuristics rely on qualitative labels provided by researchers (e.g., “availability”) or 
by managers themselves through qualitative interviews (Bingham & Eisenhardt, 2011; 
Manimala, 1992). Notwithstanding the valuable contributions of these approaches, a potential 
danger is that they allow researchers and practitioners to apply the labels flexibly (and sometimes 
incorrectly) to different processes, concluding that certain heuristics are used more commonly 
than they actually are. As an alternative, here we study heuristics as process models of decision 
making, specifying rules of how to search, when to stop search, and how to make a decision. 
With these specifications, heuristics can be implemented more easily in computer simulations 
and be tested in empirical settings more rigorously.   
Moreover, our research adds to the literature on personnel selection by examining the 
processes through which cues are integrated in selection decisions. Past research in this area has 
been mainly interested in understanding the validities of different cues (Schmidt & Hunter, 1998) 
and has seldom examined how decision makers should integrate these cues (e.g., De Corte, 1999; 
De Corte, Lievens, & Sackett, 2007) or how they actually do so (e.g., Dougherty et al., 1986; 
Kausel et al., 2016; Lievens, Highhouse, & De Corte, 2005). In addition, the limited existing 
research has relied largely on regression models and optimization procedures, explicitly or 
implicitly assuming that managers integrate cues in a “rational” manner. Our research suggests 
that these assumptions may not be warranted and that personnel selection research should take 
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heuristic process models into consideration to better understand and subsequently improve 
selection decision processes.  
Furthermore, an ecological rationality approach helps clarify a confusion in the personnel 
selection literature that tends to equate heuristic processing with intuition. For example, selection 
researchers have pointed out practitioners’ stubborn reliance on intuition and subjectivity in 
selection decisions (e.g., Highhouse, 2008). Heuristics, including Δ-inference, are not necessarily 
intuitive or subjective. Instead, by explicitly specifying the search, stopping, and decision rules, 
the objectivity and transparency of heuristics can be higher than those of complex strategies, 
whose processes and inputs (e.g., utilities) are often a black box and subject to interpretations. 
Thus, it is important to differentiate between how information on cues is sought (e.g., 
subjectively through unstructured interviews or mechanically through personality tests) and how 
the cues are being processed (e.g., subjectively through intuition or mechanically through well-
specified heuristics or other rules; Gatewood, Feild, & Barrick, 2015).  
The Methodology of Ecological Rationality 
Novel research programs and paradigms often require different methods (e.g., research on 
organizational networks; Borgatti & Foster, 2003). Drawing on cognitive sciences, modeling, 
and statistics, research in ecological rationality has developed a set of methodologies to examine 
questions related to the performance and use of decision strategies. These methods are not 
currently typical in management research and may thus present a potential entry barrier for 
researchers interested in studying ecological rationality in organizations. Ultimately, however, 
we believe that the relative sophistication of these methods usefully complements existing 
methods, allows for the rigorous study of managerial decision making, and offers opportunities 
for researchers in other areas of organizational scholarship. 
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For example, building on recent research in model testing (e.g., Czerlinski et al., 1999; 
Glöckner, 2009), we applied a comparative model testing method in Study 3. Comparative model 
testing is widely applied in cognitive sciences owing to several advantages, in particular 
increased precision and reduced ambiguity. The difference between comparative model testing 
and testing only a single model is analogous to that of alternative hypothesis testing and the 
widely criticized practice of null hypothesis testing (Cohen, 1994). Moreover, we examined the 
performance of models in prediction rather than in fitting. Prediction is of more practical use 
than fitting—consider the value of foresight over hindsight. Prediction is also better at capturing 
a model’s prescriptive and descriptive performance in an uncertain world, in which observations 
are limited, random noise is abundant, and true model parameter values may change 
dynamically, much like the decision environments managers commonly face when attempting to 
predict future states of their organization or their business environment (Gigerenzer & Brighton, 
2009). Principles and methods for predictive and comparative model testing can be easily applied 
beyond managerial decision making to examine the performances of different entrepreneurial, 
collaborative, or investment strategies. 
Practical Implications 
Ecological rationality provides not only a novel theoretical perspective on managerial 
decision making but also novel practical implications. Often, advice is based on the notion that 
heuristics lead to biases. Managers have thus been warned of heuristics and their biases 
(“forewarned is forearmed”; Hammond et al., 1998: 58), on the perhaps naïve assumption that 
once decision makers know the dangers of heuristics and biases, they will change their thinking. 
Along the same line, decision makers have been urged to move from the unconscious and 
heuristic “System 1” to the conscious and analytical “System 2” to process information 
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(Milkman, Chugh, & Bazerman, 2009). Finally, in the event that attempts to make decision 
makers think more “rationally” fail, policy makers and organizations have been encouraged to 
use “nudges” to protect people from their own decision-making incompetence (Thaler & 
Sunstein, 2008).  
An ecological rationality perspective, albeit not oblivious to the limitations of heuristics, 
rejects the view that analytical thinking is generally superior (Gigerenzer, 2008; Kruglanski & 
Gigerenzer, 2011). This research consistently found that a simple heuristic made more accurate 
personnel selection decisions when compared with a prototypical rational strategy. Importantly, 
this advantage became larger as the decision environment became arguably more typical of many 
managerial decisions, with more uncertainty and fewer learning opportunities. At the same time, 
it should be acknowledged that the accuracy advantages of the heuristic were sometimes small. 
That said, when the stakes are high (e.g., hiring the right executives) or when the same types of 
decisions are repeated many times, small increases in the probability of making the right 
decisions can mean large differences in the long run for an organization. 
Even if the accuracies of both types of strategies are similar, heuristics tend to have 
substantial advantages in terms of frugality. Our studies showed that the Δ-inference heuristic 
needed to search on average less than half of the cues to make a decision. This means lower cue 
assessment and search costs and allows for quicker decisions, a desirable objective in managerial 
decision making (Baum & Wally, 2003). Additionally, as Simon pointed out, information 
processing consumes attention: “A wealth of information creates a poverty of attention and a 
need to allocate that attention efficiently among the overabundance of information sources that 
might consume it” (1971: 41-42). In this age of information explosion and attention overload, the 
value of “fast and frugal” decision making is becoming increasingly salient for managers.  
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Ecological rationality highlights the value of being adaptive: Managerial competence lies 
in applying the appropriate strategy given the task environment and the decision maker’s 
objectives, such as accuracy, speed, frugality, or efficiency. Therefore, training programs should 
focus on helping managers develop their repertoire of heuristic and analytical decision strategies 
and apply them in an adaptive manner, informed by the decision context and purpose. Programs 
along these lines could include the explicit teaching of heuristics and their specific search, 
stopping, and decision rules, such as those in Δ-inference and fast-and-frugal trees (Luan & Reb, 
2017), with the help of visualization programs (Phillips, Neth, Woike, & Gaissmaier, 2017). An 
advantage of learning heuristics over relying on intuition is that the rules of fast-and-frugal 
heuristics can be formulated and are transparent, whereas intuitive processes by definition are 
unconscious and thus lack transparency (Hogarth, 2001). In addition to training, selection and 
promotion could also be used to identify managers who flexibly and effectively use different 
decision strategies. This would likely require a shift from selection systems that prioritize 
analytical competence to systems that value adaptive decision making.  
In the context of personnel selection, advice for practitioners has emphasized cue validities 
and the effects of cues on criteria such as performance and adverse impact. The rationale is that 
once researchers discover which cues managers should use, they can disseminate this 
information and managers will behave accordingly. However, the continued reliance on cues 
with questionable validities, despite decades of accumulated knowledge, casts doubt on the 
effectiveness of this approach (Highhouse, 2008). In its place, we suggest seeking a deeper 
understanding not only of the cues but of the decision strategies managers use as well as of their 
decision environments. On this basis, researchers and practitioners can co-develop interventions 
and decision aids, such as decision trees, that align with both managers’ natural tendencies and 
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their task environments. As a result, these strategies may be easier to adopt, more transparent, 
and more effective. Decision aids of this sort have been successfully developed in other fields, 
including medicine (e.g., Green & Mehr, 1997; Jenny et al., 2015) and the military (e.g., Keller 
& Katsikopoulos, 2016). Finally, the less-is-more principle can also be applied in job interview 
processes, given that under many realistic conditions, one good interviewer may be better than 
two or more because adding less capable interviewers is likely to detract from the performance 
of the best one (Fific & Gigerenzer, 2014).    
Strengths, Limitations, and Future Research 
 This research has both strengths and limitations that point towards directions for future 
research. A strength of our studies lies in comparative model testing, which is often more 
insightful than examining only a single strategy. However, we recognize that our studies are 
limited by examining primarily two strategies, Δ-inference and logistic regression (but see the 
results of some other strategies we tested in Study 1 in the Supplementary Materials). As such, 
care needs to be exercised in extrapolating the current findings to other decision strategies. While 
we chose these two strategies because of their suitability for the current research setting, future 
research could test additional strategies, such as take-the-best (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996), 
the recognition heuristic (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 2011), the 1/N heuristic (Hertwig, Davis, & 
Sulloway, 2002), and more sophisticated machine learning algorithms. 
 Also, when testing strategies’ prescriptive performance in Studies 1 and 2, we assumed that 
managers would learn parameters of the strategies efficiently without calculation errors, a typical 
assumption made in most studies involving simulations. In practice, however, this assumption is 
unlikely to hold, and managers are likely to encounter varying degrees of difficulty while 
learning different strategies. A strategy with parameters that are easier to learn and more robust 
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against learning errors would be advantageous over others, even though it may not perform best 
in simulations. Research in ecological rationality that has studied strategy learning at both 
prescriptive and descriptive levels is rare (e.g., Rieskamp & Otto, 2006). To better understand 
the practical performance of Δ-inference and logistic regression, issues related to learning hence 
need to be addressed and studied in future research. 
 In our studies, we focused on paired-comparison decisions between two options: the final 
two candidates for a job position. Although this is consistent with previous research and 
organizational practices (e.g., Kausel et al., 2016), we need to be cautious when generalizing the 
present findings to other selection contexts, such as decisions about a larger set of candidates or a 
single candidate. Indeed, as discussed above, it is one of the foundations of ecological rationality 
that a heuristic’s performance depends on its match with the task environment. We therefore 
neither suggest nor expect that Δ-inference will always perform well or be used for different 
decision tasks. In the course of selection, for example, tallying (Einhorn & Hogarth, 1975) may 
be used for initial screening of applicants, elimination-by-aspects (Tversky, 1972) for deciding 
among several candidates, Δ-inference for deciding between two final candidates, and fast-and-
frugal trees (Luan & Reb, 2017) for deciding whether a single candidate is sufficiently qualified. 
More research will be needed to understand the most common and effective heuristics inside 
managers’ “adaptive toolbox” of decision strategies for personnel selection.  
An interesting extension of the present research on the sequential Δ-inference heuristic 
would be to multi-stage selection systems, which are also sequential in nature. Such systems 
have been studied largely from a prescriptive perspective, examining their effects on selection 
quality and adverse impact (e.g., De Corte, Lievens, & Sackett, 2006; Finch, Edwards, & 
Wallace, 2009; Roth, Bobko, Switzer, & Dean, 2001). This research also points to another 
This is the author final version. 
Published version available from Academy of Management Journal.  
https://doi.org/10.5465/amj.2018.0172 
 
 
 44 
limitation of the present studies: We limited our investigation to a single decision criterion (i.e., 
future job performance). In selecting employees, however, organizations may try to achieve 
multiple goals, including predicting contextual performance and counterproductive behaviors, 
reducing adverse impact on applicant groups (e.g., minorities), and increasing applicant fairness 
perceptions (e.g., Sackett & Lievens, 2008). Future research could examine simple heuristics that 
are suitable for multi-criteria decision making. 
Some other features of our studies also suggest that caution is called for when generalizing 
the present results, even after we took steps to reduce such concerns. For example, although we 
investigated a real-world data set in Study 1 to increase ecological relevance, extending the 
analysis to other real-world data sets would be highly desirable to strengthen the generalizability 
of our findings. In Study 3, because of the requirement of a large number of decisions for model 
testing and cross-validation (e.g., Lewandowsky & Farrell, 2011), we chose a scenario-based 
experimental design, and many of our participants had limited experience in personnel selection 
decisions. We tried to address these concerns by using only slightly adapted job descriptions, 
basing our tasks on existing research on cue validities and cue intercorrelations (e.g., Roth et al., 
2011), and recruiting participants with varied degrees of experience in personnel selection.  
Finally, our studies were conducted in a personnel selection context only. Future research 
should examine heuristics in other types of managerial decisions, such as strategy, finance, and 
marketing, allowing for broader conclusions to be made about the ecological rationality and the 
effectiveness of heuristics in managerial decision making. The present research is best viewed as 
a stepping stone in the pursuit of this large endeavor.  
Conclusion 
In conclusion, in this research, we (a) propose ecological rationality as an alternative 
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theoretical framework through which managerial heuristics should be viewed and studied, (b) 
challenge the common view in management research that heuristics are second-best through two 
prescriptive studies, (c) investigate in a descriptive study how decision makers integrate different 
cues in making decisions pertaining to personnel selection, and (d) introduce a set of novel 
methods to study the performance and processes of managerial decision making.  
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APPENDIX A: INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE EACH EXPERIMENTAL CONDITION 
IN STUDY 3 
The Receptionist Condition  
In this part of this study, we will ask you to make decisions on 105 pairs of candidates for a 
receptionist position. Please carefully read the position description below before moving on to 
the next part of the study in which you will make your decisions.  
 
Position: Receptionist 
Responsibilities: 
 Manage front desk duties including: 
o Greet and attend to walk-in guests on their appointment and queries 
o Exchanging of visitor passes 
o Usher guests to meeting rooms 
o Handle general queries related to meeting rooms and booking of facilities 
 Attend to incoming calls to main office hotline and handle caller’s enquiries 
 Re-direct calls as appropriate and take adequate messages when required 
 Assist in the preparation of refreshments for meetings and meeting rooms (includes the 
setup of video conferencing equipment, laptop, etc.) 
 Collate and prepare monthly statistical report for submission to management 
 Provide general office administration support 
 Any other duties as assigned 
 
The Analyst Condition  
In this part of this study, we will ask you to make decisions on 105 pairs of candidates for a 
lead data analyst position. Please carefully read the position description below before moving on 
to the next part of the study in which you will make your decisions.  
 
Position: Lead Data Analyst 
Responsibilities: 
 Work with business departments and other technical team to gather data assets to support 
a single source of truth for all data across departments 
 Design and build logical data model to meet business capabilities and technical 
requirements from different source systems and databases 
 Analyse potential areas where existing data model, data policy and procedures require 
change, or where new ones need to be developed, especially regarding future business 
capabilities 
 Gather data requirements, design and implement data integration, data quality, data 
cleansing and other ETL-related projects 
 Perform ETL programming activities with scripts, packages and mappings using SAS 
data management solution 
 Build dashboards and reports using Qlik solution to provide business and operational to 
the departments 
 Use statistical methods to analyse customer data trends and generate useful business 
reports 
 Provide primary operational support for information architecture, data factory and data 
analysis 
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Table 1. Statistical properties of the criterion variable (FJP) and the three cues from 236 job applicants at an airline company, Study 1. 
 
Range Mean SD 
Correlation matrix 
  FJP GMA CON USIP 
Future job performance (FJP)   [1.75, 4.50] 3.16 0.44 1 --- --- --- 
General mental ability (GMA)   [0.42, 0.96] 0.70 0.12 0.30 1 --- --- 
Conscientiousness (CON)   [2.27, 5.00] 3.95 0.45 0.22 0.10 1 --- 
Unstructured interview performance (USIP)   [2, 5] 3.20 1.02 0.06 0.11 0.02 1 
 
Note: The scale range for each variable is as follows: FJP: 1–5, GMA: 0–1, CON: 1–5, and USIP: 1–5.  
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Table 2. Parameter values (i.e., cue validities and intercue correlations) used to construct the simulated task environments of Study 2. 
 Meta-analytic correlation matrix Parameter values 
  FJP GMA CON SIP a b c d e f 
Future job performance (FJP) 1 --- --- --- 0.05 0.05 0.05 −0.10 0.14 0.02 
General mental ability (GMA) 0.30 (a) 1 --- --- 0.20 0.08 0.20 0 0.24 0.12 
Conscientiousness (CON) 0.18 (b) 0 (d) 1 --- 0.30 0.18 0.30 0.10 0.34 0.22 
Structured interview performance (SIP) 0.30 (c) 0.24 (e) 0.12 (f) 1 0.40 0.28 0.40    
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Table 3. Results pertaining to the ecological rationality of logistic regression and Δ-inference in Study 2.  
Sample size 
Mean relative frequency of logistic  
regression predicting better than Δ-inference  
Bivariate correlation with relative frequency of  
logistic regression predicting better than Δ-inference  
Mean frugality  
of Δ-inference 
(cues searched) Overall J-shaped Not J-shaped 
Best cue’s relative  
predictiveness 
Linear    
predictability 
n = 30 0.44 0.44 0.45 −0.38 0.31 1.26 
n = 100 0.49 0.46 0.50 −0.61 0.78 1.36 
n =1,000 0.65 0.59 0.71 −0.69 0.73 1.45 
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Table 4. Some key measures of Study 3 by experimental condition. 
Measure 
Receptionist 
condition 
Analyst 
condition 
Reaction time (RT) 
% of abnormal RTs 2.03 1.89 
Mean (in seconds) 5.28 5.21 
SD (in seconds) 2.79 2.65 
Average rank of a cue by 
participants’ subjective 
importance ratings 
GMA 2.43 1.60 
CON 1.60 1.98 
SIP 1.97 2.42 
Proportion of participants 
classified as using a certain 
strategy 
Logistic regression 0.51 0.62 
Δ-inference 0.49 0.38 
Notes. GMA = general mental ability; CON = conscientiousness; SIP = structured interview performance.
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  Candidate A   Candidate B 
General mental ability 116   102 
Conscientiousness 47   55 
Structured interview 
performance 
3.6  3.9 
 
Figure 1. An example of a paired-comparison decision in which two job candidates’ scores on three cues, general mental ability (GMA), 
conscientiousness (CON), and structured interview performance (SIP), are provided.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  58 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. The prediction accuracy of Δ-inference and logistic regression in a paired-comparison selection task based on data of 236 actual 
job applicants at an airline company, Study 1. n = sample size. 
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Figure 3.  Scatter plots of the relative frequency of logistic regression predicting better than Δ-inference against the best cue’s relative 
predictiveness (left) and the linear predictability of an environment (right), when sample size was 100 in Study 2.   
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Figure 4. Proportion of participants in Study 3 classified as using Δ-inference, depending on participants’ previous experience in selection 
decision, whether the distribution of their cue importance ratings was skewed, and the job condition in which decisions were 
made. The dotted line in each panel indicates the overall proportion of participants classified as using Δ-inference in each job 
condition. Error bars indicate standard errors.  
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Figure 5. The rate of strategy switching from the receptionist condition to the analyst condition for the less and the more experienced 
participants, Study 3.  
